Category — TreatWatch

While on the subject of Hamid Gul: Al-Qaeda’s Man In Pakistan, consider this from the good general in the Washington Times regarding the Marriott bombing.

But reports that the government had received intelligence information of an attack in the capital two days earlier had many in Islamabad and elsewhere in the country enraged.

“The intelligence agencies had done their bit. Their job is to gather the information, and they had done this” said retired Gen. Hamid Gul, former director-general of the nation’s intelligence agency. “The failing is on the part of the government, and it´s a huge and shameful failing.”

Gen. Gul, who was instrumental in forming the Afghani Taliban in the 1990s, says the police and other security agencies were so busy in arranging protection for President Asif Ali Zardari´s first address to the parliament that they had ignored the security of the ordinary public.

Pakistan has limited resources, he said. “And when we dedicate these resources to over-protecting one man or a few VIPs, then the result is going to be underprotection of the rest of the city.”

Yes. Secular government bad, compromised/infested intelligence agencies good.

Before the objective among us attempt to explain ways in which General Gul may ‘have a point,’ let’s note for the record the complete absence - ever - of criticism of Taliban or al-Qaeda terrorists for murdering those in their path, the very people Hamid Gul seeks to insinuate championing with supposed interests in their own security.

Gul has no ‘point.’ He has a vision. It’s called a global caliphate beginning with a Gul-lead and al-Qaeda-owned Pakistan.

Pay attention. It’s free.

In our last Pakistan PrincipalAnalysis, Al-Qaeda’s Progression On Pakistan’s Demise, we spelled out the line of succession the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance desires in order to exact control of Pakistan and its resources, including its nuclear arsenal. The end-game in the progression rests upon the shoulders of Usama bin Laden friend and former Pakistani ISI director, retired General Hamid Gul. Paying attention to Hamid Gul’s words and actions can serve as an excellent indicator of al-Qaeda aims and actions inside Pakistan.

To wit, notice this quote from Hamid Gul within a September 13, 2008 Washington Post article. He is talking within the context of US raids into Pakistan by both CIA Predator drones and US Special Forces ground units within the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, North and South Waziristan in particular.

“If bombs were to fall in Karachi and Islamabad, that would then be considered an act of war. The Pakistani government wants to pretend that these areas [Note: FATA areas, not Islamabad & Kirachi] are not part of Pakistan, but they are,” said retired Gen. Hamid Gul, former director of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI). “Instead of solving the problem, it has only exacerbated it. If those people in those areas were not part of the Taliban forces before these strikes, they will be now.”

Of course, gaining popular support among local Pakistanis in the tribal areas dominated by the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance has always been a propaganda goal after every attack.

Further, barely one week later, a massive bomb did ‘fall’ in Islamabad at the Marriott Hotel. And by Hamid Gul’s own definition, this is an act of war against Pakistan. Now, we know this is already the case, as the insurgency is seeking to decapitate the Pakistani government in order to usurp it and control its resources and population. Gul’s words here are simply further illuminating regarding his opposition to the Pakistani government (no secret).

But perhaps no recent quote from Hamid Gul, the “Godfather of the Taliban,” is more illuminating than what he told Syed Saleem Shahzad of Adnkronos International (AKI) Monday after the Marriott bombing.

Former Pakistani spy master, Retired Lt. General Hamid Gul said that the militants had watched their target for days and then selected a vehicle carrying construction materials and loaded the vehicle with over 600 kilogrammes of explosives.

While not a direct quote, note with clarity how Hamid Gul does not appear to be speculating, but rather stating as known fact. It would be easy enough to speculate the same, but he is not speculating. How, one must ask, does he know this?

The question is entirely rhetorical.

1. Pakistani president Zardari reportedly had planned post-address dinner at Marriott but changed venue to PM’s residence hours before the blast. Marriott management denies reservation was made. PPP leadership appears intended target for the attack.

2. UN extends NATO mission in Afghanistan as 140 laborers reported abducted by Taliban in Afghanistan and Afghan diplomat kidnapped in Peshawar, Pakistan.

3. Massive anti-Iran protest took place in New York ahead of Ahmadinejad’s UN address there. IAEA says Iran has not disclosed full info on nuke program while Ahmadinejad maintains IAEA will exonerate Iranian program as peaceful.

4. Israeli PM Olmert has handed in resignation letter amid corruption charges. Now heads interim government as Tzipi Livni continues run for the job.

5. Palestinian rams car into crowd of IDF soldiers in Jerusalem, injuring 15 soldiers and 4 civilians. Palestinian woman blinds an IDF soldier by throwing acid in his face in the West Bank town of Nablus.

After Columbine, some high schools added metal detectors to their main entrances. After Virginia Tech, the debate raged as to how such incidents could be prevented in the future. Violence and terrorism is schools, clearly a “soft” target, is just one of our many fears. In the Beslan school shooting in 2004, 330 people including 186 children were killed. Just this morning there are reports coming out of Finland of at least nine people being killed when a gunman opened fire at a vocational school for adults. The list is fightening, and the threat of violence mass violence is schools is real, whether by a disgruntled student or by act of terrorism.

Some of the solutions posed ranged from installing multi-node communications alert systems on campuses to allowing students with carry permits to be armed on campus. What should we do and how far should we go to prevent another campus massacre? This past summer a community college in South Texas was forced to issue a restraining order against a student who was angry with her public speaking professor for giving her a “B” for a speech he didn’t understand. The student claimed that the professor ridiculed her and that the “B” would prevent her from becoming a Supreme Court Justice. Franchesca O’Neal, a 26-year-old political science major, sued for $5 million and an A in the class. However, the student’s own words would likely disqualify her from such career aspirations.

In a pleading filed in August, O’Neal said she knew murder was a crime, but wanted to shoot Falcon dead.

“I would even be willing to let the B stand to blow the back of his head out,” O’Neal wrote, noting that she was formerly in the military and knew how to handle a sidearm. She warned that teachers should be careful in how they treat students: “Students do not throw toilet paper into trees or soap up windows anymore. They pull weapons out of backpacks, and I for one do not want to find myself dodging bullets,” she wrote.

O’Neal said she never meant any harm; she was only trying to point out that a teacher’s ridicule could push an unstable person over the edge.

“There are not many students who would pursue justice the way I have,” O’Neal said in an interview. “People do take matters into their own hands. (Falcon) does not know what someone is willing to fight back with.”

It is a hefty issue. Late last month a school district north of Dallas, in Harrold Texas, approved a change in policy that allows employees to carry licensed concealed weapons. Before you utter, “well it’s Texas” you should note that the arming of school police is being debated in Memphis Tennessee as well.

Random shootings, mass murders at schools, college campuses, shopping malls and churches have occurred across the country in recent years. How far do we go to prevent another campus massacre?

John Robb lays out a disturbing scenario:

The modern nation-state is in a secular decline, made inevitable by the rise of a global market system. Even developed nations, like the US, are not immune to this process. The decline is at first gradual and then accelerates until it reaches a final end-point: a hollow state. The hollow state has the trappings of a modern nation-state (“leaders”, membership in international organizations, regulations, laws, and a bureaucracy) but it lacks any of the legitimacy, services, and control of its historical counter-part. It is merely a shell that has some influence over the spoils of the economy. The real power rests in the hands of corporations and criminal/guerrilla groups that vie with each other for control of sectors of wealth production. For the individual living within this state, life goes on, but it is debased in a myriad of ways.

Like all of John’s writing it is worth a full read.

This is not going to happen here, tomorrow, but that it happens period is not out of the question. One need only look at the mayhem wrought by narco-gangs on what passes for a state just to our south, or any of the other examples John sites to know that it happens.

What is your primary loyalty and how will you defend it? Are you an American first and will you cling to whatever form the government takes and functions it affords regardless of the changes to your life, liberty and property; or will you join the retrograde movement down through regional, ethnic and familial bonds that were whittled away at the start of the last century? Perhaps more importantly, would the real threat to the US be - in the midst of such a scenario - the current state forcing us to participate in its decline with the full force and power at its disposal?

Food for thought.

From the Jerusalem-based Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center is a report examining a recent push by Hamas security forces to confront an al-Qaeda linked group in Gaza.

1. On September 15, 2008 , confrontations broke out between Hamas security forces and members of the Dughmush clan in the Al-Sabra section of Gaza City . The clan is important and powerful in the Gaza Strip. The confrontations began with security force attempts to detain two to its members, and led to the deaths of 11 Dughmushes and the wounding of 46. One Hamas policeman was killed and another wounded.

2. Among those killed and wounded by Hamas were a number of operatives of the Army of Islam , a radical Islamic group affiliated with Al-Qaeda (See the Appendix.) One of those killed was Ibrahim Dughmush, the brother of Army of Islam commander Mumtaz Dughmush, who may have been wounded in the fighting and/or detained by Hamas. The Hamas security forces also seized large quantities of weapons (light arms, RPGs, hand grenades and military equipment). Fifteen members of the Dughmush clan were detained following the confrontations.

3. Hamas represented the events as routine police activities were yet another Hamas step to suppress opposition in the Gaza Strip . Hamas is particularly eager to weaken the local clans (such as Dughmush and Hilles) and the terrorist organizations which do not accept Hamas authority, even if they are radical-Islamic, such as the Army of Islam.

4. The Hamas media were quick to represent the Dughmush clan members killed during the confrontations as criminals and the actions of the police as routing anti-crime police activity. However, the large force employed by Hamas indicates that the events were exploited to tighten security and control in the Gaza Strip by the violent suppression of focal points of anti-Hamas power and influence, which the organization regards as undermining its rule.

It’s red on red, the best kind of conflict.

Former Indian intelligence chief B. Raman has issued a report at the South Asia Analysis Group which indicates Danish intelligence - and perhaps not the American CIA - may well have been the primary target of the bombing at the Marriott Hotel in Pakistan. Raman cites previous attacks on Danish targets inside Pakistan and the connection to Islamist rage at the Dutch publication of cartoon depicting the prophet Muhammad.

4. While Al Qaeda had claimed the responsibility for the blast outside the Danish Embassy in Islamabad on June 3, 2008, it did not in respect of the other strikes mentioned by Amir Mir. Al Qaeda targeted the Danish Embassy in protest against the cartoons on the Holy Prophet carried by the Danish media. It continues to call for more attacks on Danish targets.

5. After the controversy over the cartoons broke out two years ago, Denmark had drastically reduced the strength of its home-based staff in its Embassy in Islamabad. It was running a truncated mission with the help of either Pakistani recruits or Danish citizens of Pakistani origin. However, it is learnt that it was having a small office in the Marriott Hotel, which was staffed by officers of the Danish intelligence agency responsible for counter-terrorism. They were monitoring the developments relating to terrorism in Pakistan and maintaining a liaison with the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The information about the presence of a small cell of the Danish intelligence in the hotel seems to have leaked out to Al Qaeda.

6. The official figures of fatalities in the blast are 53. Of these, one has been described as a Danish citizen. Another Danish citizen is stated to be missing. An Agence France Press (AFP) report from Copenhagen says as follows: “A Danish intelligence agent is missing after Saturday’s devastating suicide bomb attack on the Marriott hotel in Pakistan’s capital Islamabad, Denmark’s Foreign Minister said on Sunday.”We are talking about a member of the intelligence services stationed at the embassy in Islamabad, with no sign of life,” Per Stig Moeller told TV2 news channel. “What we have heard is that a Dane likely figures among the dead. If that proves to be the case, it would be profoundly tragic,” he added, because he had been sent to Pakistan to improve security for Danish staff there. The Danish intelligence agency, PET, said in a separate statement that one of its agents, a security advisor, had been posted missing, presumed dead. A second PET official was unhurt, it said. Earlier, the Foreign Ministry’s head of diplomacy Klavs Holm told AFP that teams were scouring the city’s hospitals and other places looking for the missing national. “Several other Danes were in the hotel, they have been slightly hurt” in the explosion, Holm said, adding that these people, three in number, were all employed by the Danish Embassy in Islamabad. Saturday’s suicide blast was “an attack on cooperation between Pakistan and the international community, because these Islamists, these fanatics, want to break relations between the West and the democratically-elected Pakistani Government,” he added.

As it stands, it appears one Danish intelligence agent is missing while at least two US Marines attached to the US Embassy in Pakistan are among the dead.

Whichever intelligence agency was the primary target, two things are important to come away from this with.

1. Distinguishing between ‘al-Qaeda’ as publicly perceived among Americans and the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) fellow travelers suspected as being responsible and referred to in B. Raman’s article is useful only in the micro-level. They are part of the al-Qaeda umbrella established in 1998 as the International Islamic Front (IIF).

2. The primary physical target was not the Pakistani political system or any Pakistani politician - not President Zardari (PPP) and not Prime Minister Gilani (PPP). The physical primary target was foreign intelligence, whether the CIA, the Danish intelligence office at the Marriott or some other nation’s organization. The attack served its ever-present secondary psychological effect, which was to strike the perception of al-Qaeda capabilities and that of weakness in the Pakistani government and security in the eyes of the Pakistani public.

When it comes to al-Qaeda targeting Pakistani political figures - and those who lie in waiting to replace them - within the context of the Taliban-al-Qaeda insurgency, readers may wish to revisit the PrincipalAnalysis on the subject earlier this month.

Al-Qaeda’s Progression On Pakistan’s Demise: Schizophrenic Pakistan And The Coming Vacuum That Invites al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda must be (and has been) more discerning when targeting political figures in the Pakistani government. The useful PML-N politicians headed by Nawaz Sharif (bought and paid for al-Qaeda goods) cannot be included as victims in an attack as indiscriminate as a dump truck loaded with 1,300lbs of explosives, mines, mortars and aluminum powder. Remember, Bhutto was assassinated with a bullet, and the recent attempt on PM Gilani’s life was with an armor-piercing sniper round that pierced the double-layered bullet-proof glass in his US-supplied armored limousine.

Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N, virulent in their opposition to both the ruling PPP and the United States, are too useful to al-Qaeda to risk alienating them through collateral damage from attacks by imprecise and massive bombings.

Late last night, I took a look at the Marriott bombing in Islamabad. Who were the real targets, who were the attackers, and what might it mean for Pakistan going forward. It was closer to morning than night when recorded, so forgive the less than smooth verbal discussion. I just decided to flip on the microphone and record a few thoughts.

You can give it a listen here:

Fire Watch: September 21, 2008

CNN is reporting that the Czech ambassador to Pakistan has been missing since the bombing of the Islamabad Marriott. From the report:

The Czech Republic’s ambassador to Pakistan has been missing since a deadly blast Saturday night at the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad, the Czech News Agency reported.

Ivo Zdarek, 47, moved from Vietnam to Pakistan a month ago and was staying at the hotel, the national news agency said. It attributed its information to officials at the Czech foreign ministry.

A truck bombing of the Islamabad Marriott Hotel in Pakistan has killed at least 60 and wounded more than 200. The Marriott is about a quarter mile from Pakistan’s national parliament and the prime minister’s residence.

While the BBC reports a security official speculating that either of these was likely the primary target, the ThaiIndian News reports that senior CIA officers staying at the Islamabad Marriott were the primary targets.

Well placed sources said that Marriott Hotel is usual hotel choice of the US officials and it seems that militants tipped off that certain high level US intelligence officers were currently staying at the hotel.

While no confirmation was available but Pakistan sources said it was clear that the explosion was aimed at specific targets based on a tip off.

Recall that that on January 14 of this year there was a suicide attack on the luxury five-star Serena Hotel in Kabul. Like the Marriott in Islamabad, the Serena Hotel was the lodging of choice for key foreign dignitaries and UA FBI and CIA agents.

With the latest tension between the US and Pakistan, exacerbated by the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance which seeks the divisive tension, US military and intelligence visits with Pakistani leaders have increased in an effort to cool the situation as much as possible. Thus, the Marriott was likely the target of choice, as the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance would be unlikely to cause added friction with the government that is currently serving its aims by distancing itself from the United States.

President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani, both of the ruling PPP, are on the Taliban’s hit list. However, a more precise means of liquidation can be expected with such figures, rather than risk killing or driving away helpful others among the Pakistani government with a large, indiscriminate bombing.

The crater left by the massive truck bomb was approximately 30 feet. And while it appears to have detonated some distance from the main housing unit of the hotel, it ruptured a gas line which has set major sections of the Marriott ablaze.

This is not a preferred means of assassinating the president or prime minister given the current political climate. A bullet is much preferred. It is, however, a preferred means of attacking a Western hotel chain housing potentially hundreds of Westerners, including US intelligence officers.

From the International Herald Tribune, a story describing how Georgia has offered fresh evidence on the war’s start. Namely, Georgia has released intercepted phone calls from the Russian-South Ossetia border as border guards discuss the crossing of Russian armor into South Ossetia 20 hours before Georgia launched it’s defensive attack.

But at a minimum, the intercepted calls, which senior American officials have reviewed and described as credible if not conclusive, suggest there were Russian military movements earlier than had previously been acknowledged, whether routine or hostile, into Georgian territory as tensions accelerated toward war.

They also suggest the enduring limits — even with high-tech surveillance of critical battlefield locations — of penetrating the war’s thick fogs.

The back and forth over who started the war is already an issue in the American presidential race, with Governor Sarah Palin of Alaska, the Republican vice presidential candidate, contending that Russia’s incursion into Georgia was “unprovoked,” while others argue that Georgia’s shelling of Tshkinvali was provocation. Georgia claims that its main evidence — two of several calls secretly recorded by its intelligence service on Aug. 7 and 8 — shows that Russian tanks and fighting vehicles were already passing through the Roki Tunnel linking Russia to South Ossetia before dawn on Aug. 7.

By Russian accounts, the war began at 11:30 that night, when President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia ordered an attack on Russian positions in Tshkinvali. Russian combat units crossed the border into South Ossetia only later, Russia has said.

Russia has not disputed the veracity of the phone calls, which were apparently made by Ossetian border guards on a private Georgian cellphone network. “Listen, has the armor arrived or what?” a supervisor at the South Ossetian border guard headquarters asked a guard at the tunnel with the surname Gassiev, according to a call that Georgia and the cellphone provider said was intercepted at 3:52 a.m. on Aug. 7.

“The armor and people,” the guard replied. Asked if they had gone through, he said, “Yes, 20 minutes ago; when I called you, they had already arrived.”

Doug Farah writes on Russia’s New Efforts to Arm State Sponsors of Terrorism over with our friends at the Counterterrorism Blog. It is well worth your reading time today, and another indicator for those who may harbor hopeful doubt that Russia is indeed an American enemy.

I am not a Russia expert, but it is clear that the Putin-led government is going out of its way to antagonize the United States and its allies. One of the primary, and most dangerous methods, is the sale of billions of dollars of sophisticated weaponry to state sponsors of terrorism, particularly Iran and Venezuela.

These just happen to be the two states most intent on inflicting as much harm as possible on the United States and its allies, as well as the two governments funding the unrest that has pushed Bolivia to the brink of civil war and actions that are turning Nicaragua into the pariah state.

As the Times of London notes,the sales include anti-aircraft missiles and top of the line fighter jets, due in production in 2010.

It is interesting to note that Russia’s deputy prime minister, Igor Sechin, one of the closest allies of Mr Putin, the Prime Minister, visited Venezuela and Cuba this week. Sechin is widely reported to be the main backer of Viktor Bout, the notorious weapons trafficker in prison in Thailand, awaiting an extradition hearing next week to determine if he will be handed over to the United States to stand trial.

(In an ominous sign that Bout’s extradition will not be approved, the Thai appellate court, for the first time this week, rejected a U.S. extradition request. This one was for Jamshid Ghassemi, an Iranian indicted in the United States for acquiring dual-use equipment and accelerometers for Iran’s nuclear program. The court ruling gave no reasons for its decision, which is unappealable, and foul play is suspected.

There are several parallels to the Bout case, where the Russians have been offering large financial inducements, oil deals and preferential weapons deals in exchange for Bout’s freedom. Another terrorist supplier under Russian protection.)

In the heat of the political season, which assures no shortage of rhetoric finding fault with American actions and causes first, it should be soberly acknowledged that these choices are Russia’s and Russia’s alone. Any assertion that American policy or leadership is the cause for Russia’s continued embrace of Iran, Venezuela and Syria (among others) is both vapid and naive.

Remember, immediately after Hamas won the Palestinian elections in 2006, Russia wanted to supply them with 50 armored personnel carriers and a pair of helicopters.

1. Despite public protestations and threats from Pakistani military leaders, US drone flights continue over al-Qaeda havens inside Pakistan. A strike earlier this week reportedly killed an al-Qaeda leader and another ‘Arab’ in South Waziristan.

2. The Pakistani Taliban (TTP) are reported to have claimed responsibility for the Barcelona plot broken up earlier this year, another indication of the continued ideological and strategic merge between Pakistani Taliban and Arab al-Qaeda.

3. The issue of immunity for US troops in the Iraq combat zone is a primary stumbling block stalling a force agreement between the US and Iraq moving beyond the December expiration of the UN mandate.

Iran is arming the Taliban in Afghanistan with devastating weaponry. This should not come as a surprise. Iran, through their EFP (Explosively Formed Penetrator) used as roadside bombs in Iraq, is responsible for over 10% of all US casualties in Iraq since the 2003 invasion. And that figure (10%) is not Iran’s total attribution, but from just that one weapon, the EFP. When other weapons known to have been shipped in by Iran are taken into account - such as mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, AK-47’s, ammunition, AA missiles and other explosives - the percentage increases. This must be understood.

So it is logical that, as the situation in Iraq cools and combat focus (for both al-Qaeda and the US) begins to shift to Afghanistan and Pakistan (yes, Pakistan), the Iranians who sought to kill and maim American forces in Iraq will shift their deadly wares increasingly to Afghanistan and the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance to their south. Within that context, please take the time to read the following from the BBC.

Iranian arms

He said their favourite weapons were Iranian:

“There’s a kind of mine called the Dragon. Iran is sending it and we have got it. It’s directional and very powerful.”

The Dragon appears to be a local name for what is internationally called an Explosively Formed Penetrator.

As the commander testified, it can penetrate the armour of Humvees and even tanks.

He said it was only available to special groups and you had to have “good relations” with the Iranians to get it.

Former mujahedeen fighter Shahir - which is not his real name - said Iranian weapons commanded a premium price:

“The beauty of the Iranian-made AK47, for example, is that it can also fire grenades. It costs $200-$300 dollars more than a Kalashnikov made elsewhere.”

Shahir said there were two routes for Iranian weapons to reach the Taleban.

“There are people inside the state in Iran who donate weapons. There are also Iranian businessmen who sell them.”

Britain and America have also alleged that elements in the Iranian state are helping to fund the Taleban, but it is rare to get confirmation from the Taleban side.

The Iranian Embassy in Kabul denied the allegations, saying Tehran supported the government of Afghanistan.

Iran is our enemy. They kill us at every opportunity but prefer plausible deniability.

There is little space for US domestic political gamesmanship - such as the shameful gamesmanship surrounding the anti-Iran rally in New York. Iran does not care which party you belong to. A dead American soldier makes for their good day. That should be enough for the presidential campaigns to put politics aside and stand together - perhaps, just maybe, within the same camera lens.

UPDATE: Readers may wish to consider the following JCPA Report for context:

Hizballah’s Role in Attacks Against U.S. and British Forces in Iraq

A report in a Spanish newspaper holds that the primary Pakistani Taliban group, Tehrik-i-Taliban, claimed responsibility for foiled terror plan in Barcelona in which commuter trains were to be bombed once again.

The point to take from this is further reinforcement of what we have been asserting for some time: Differentiating al-Qaeda from the Taliban is an endeavor with rapidly diminishing returns.

The Taliban has long made public their intent to launch terrorist attacks beyond the Afghanistan/Pakistan region, and the attempt in Spain is an example of this intent. Intent and capability, thankfully, are two different matters. It is not incorrect to say that the various Taliban groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan have very localized grievances and aims. That of course remains so. But the Taliban have adopted their al-Qaeda guests’ desire for extended reach and aligned much with their overall goals, including creating a global caliphate beginning with the consumption of Pakistan.

Goals of each, once seen as wholly different in aim and scope, are now inextricably merged as the ‘Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance’ - as I have termed it for some time - continues to show more signs of blending than distinguishing one from the other.

Meanwhile, hellfire-armed US unmanned aerial drones continue to patrol western Pakistani skies over al-Qaeda strongholds, regardless of Pakistani public posturing vowing to shoot down US aircraft. And in a strike earlier this week, an al-Qaeda commander and another ‘Arab’ were killed along with other occupants of the house hit with four hellfire missiles.

The war rages on.

A couple of days ago, the role of open source intelligence was discussed in great detail by my colleagues in Open Source Intelligence - A ThreatsWatch Symposium.

So it shouldn’t be too surprising that the Department of Homeland Security has been criticized for not meeting open source standards as established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. In July 2008, the House passed a bill, H.R.3815 that required the DHS Secretary to establish an open source program.

The Democratic Majority Staff of the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security, at the request of the Chairman, Congressman Bennie Thompson issued this report.

“The Department is far behind the rest of the Intelligence Community in implementing a comprehensive open source intelligence program,” said Rep. Bennie Thompson, chair of the Homeland Security Committee. “I am convinced that the department must make a concerted effort to understand their intelligence needs and produce intelligence products that provide actionable recommendations for the cop on the beat.”

This is an issue that crosscuts homeland and national security. While no system is perfect, and sometimes sensitive information becomes open through human error, more often, information is only sensitive in the hands of analysts who can put it the information in context. Analysts in states’ fusion centers analyze information from multiple sources and juridictions. One of the more striking findings of the report is that respondents do not see DHS as a source of reliable open source information.

In the absence of a robust DHS program, the disparity in where law enforcement officers go to access open source intelligence could not be starker – most tellingly revealed when
respondents were asked which Federal agency they relied upon most for actionable unclassified intelligence. Out of 329 respondents, 227 or 69% said the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) met their needs. Just 58 law enforcement officials or 17% of the respondents stated that they relied mostly on DHS.

While I read a tremendous amount of material from many open sources, a good deal of the information that I get is through Infragard and its periodic releases of information. While some of it is from DHS, more often, it is from the Bureau. Sometimes, this information eventually wends its way to public information, while some remains off the radar screen of the general population.

In today’s DailyBriefing, we included a link to The Pakistan Policy Blog to a piece titled ‘The Line of Control’. Below is an extensive excerpt that provides an important glimpse into the friction between General Kiyani and President Zardari. It may potentially evolve into the flashpoint that triggers yet another coup in Pakistan, as I alluded to last month in “Start Your Kiyani Coup-Coup Clock, Boys” at The Tank on National Review Online. It depends on how hard Zardari (and teh US) pushes for civilian control of the ISI, Pakistan’s military intelligence arm with historic and contemporary ties to both the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

Neither the Pakistani public nor its security establishment will accept compromise on Kashmir in a context of weakness. Gen. Kayani has spoken of “peace through strength.”

TARGETING ISI WILL BACKFIRE ON ZARDARI

In this context, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher’s calls for the “reform” of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence will hit a brick wall. The civilian government is, in effect, being thrown at this wall, i.e. the army, and will bear the direct consequences of such action. This is something Zardari must consider out of both self and national interest.

Moreover, the idea of reform presupposes the existence of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ in this realm. Intelligence agencies by nature operate in an amoral universe. They are tasked with doing the government’s dirty work clandestinely and non-conventionally. Their sole task is to serve the national interest, unconstrained not by conventional bounds but simply by capability and risk. Criticizing one agency on moral grounds makes little sense — they all play the same game by the same (lack of) rules. There is not a conflict of morals, but of interests. These can only be dealt with by clandestine competition or dialogue and compromise at a conventional level. The latter is the more prudent path.

The first target of ISI “reform” would seemingly be the organization’s director general, Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj. Indeed, some in Washington are pressing for civilian control of the ISI. This is a recipe for disaster. Zardari’s earlier attempt to bring the ISI under civilian control failed. After another attempt, he’ll find himself sitting out on the pavement outside of the presidential palace. Zardari lacks the legitimacy and power with which to assert himself over the military. While the Pakistani public supports the cessation of the ISI’s political role, there is no support for tying the organization’s hands in other matters. If pressed by Zardari, Gen. Kayani would be forced to enter the political realm, against his will, because of civilian excess. Zardari should be wiser and focus on his self-proclaimed mandate of roti (bread), kapra (clothing), and makan (a home).

And so, Gen. Kayani is delineating the parameters of acceptable discourse on Kashmir, and at a broader level, Pakistan’s national security issues. Gen. Kayani has given the civilians free reign over non-security matters. He has, however, drawn a line in the sand. The civilians cannot pass the line of control into his own domain. Given Zardari’s consolidation of power and the absence of checks and balances upon him, a foolish press against the military would compel that institution to intervene, making his presidency the shortest in Pakistan’s history.

I think Arif Rafiq’s observations here are (again) very valuable to consider when attempting to project a near- to mid-term Pakistani environment.

American dual-use merchandise purchased primarily online was sent to Iran and then used to construct improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to kill US forces and civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan. So reads a federal indictment charging a combination of 16 companies and individuals, including six Iranians living abroad.

Charges were brought against six Iranians, two of them naturalized British citizens and one said to be “residing in Malaysia,” and two other people of unlisted nationality living in Germany and Malaysia. Five indicted companies were said to be based in Dubai, two in Malaysia and one in Iran. None of the indicted people is in custody.

The indictment described a sophisticated conspiracy in which items including 12,000 micro-controllers — which can be used to trigger IEDs — 5,000 integrated circuits and 345 Global Positioning System devices were purchased from suppliers spread across the United States via e-mail orders and wire transfers. End-users were falsely identified as universities and companies in countries including Dubai, Malaysia and Britain.

Most of the items ended up in the hands of Dubai-based trading companies, principally a firm identified as Mayrow General Trading, which then allegedly transferred them to Iran via Iran Air, the Iranian national airline.

1. US Embassy bombing in Yemen believed the work of al-Qaeda, 25 arrested thus far in connection amid warnings of more attacks.

2. Defense Secretary Gates says Afghanistan strategy is now under review as General Petraeus takes CENTCOM command.

3. Sixteen companies and individuals named in US federal indictment over dual-use parts purchases sent to Iran for making IED’s. Six Iranians living abroad among the charged.

4. Russia’s President Medvedev again assures Russian military defense of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, while Ukraine pushes for NATO membership.

In No Oil for Blood, co-architect for the successful surge strategy in Iraq Fred Kagan details how three US Senators killed an Iraqi deal with US oil firms to develop part of their industry. And in so doing, the door was opened for China to seize the contracts instead. It’s maddening, and on par with the logic of watching Chinese oil companies drill for oil and gas resources just off the Florida coast and not us.

The Iraqi government was poised to sign no-bid contracts with those firms this summer to help make immediate and needed improvements in Iraq’s oil infrastructure. The result would have been significant foreign investment in Iraq, an expansion of Iraqi government revenues, and an increase in the global supply of oil. One would have thought that leading Democratic senators who claim to be interested in finding other sources of funding to replace American dollars in Iraq, in helping Iraq spend its own money on its own people, and in lowering the price of gasoline for American citizens, would have been all for it. Instead, Senators Chuck Schumer, John Kerry, and Claire McCaskill wrote a letter to Secretary of State Rice asking her “to persuade the GOI [Government of Iraq] to refrain from signing contracts with multinational oil companies until a hydrocarbon law is in effect in Iraq.” The Bush administration wisely refused to do so, but the resulting media hooraw in Iraq led to the cancellation of the contracts, and helps to explain why Iraq is doing oil deals instead with China.

Senators Schumer, McCaskill, and Kerry claimed to be acting from the purest of motives: “It is our fear that this action by the Iraqi government could further deepen political tensions in Iraq and put our service members in even great danger.” For that reason, presumably, Schumer went so far as to ask the senior vice president of Exxon “if his company would agree to wait until the GOI produced a fair, equitable, and transparent hydrocarbon revenue sharing law before it signed any long-term agreement with the GOI.” Exxon naturally refused, but Schumer managed to get the deal killed anyway. But the ostensible premise of the senators’ objections was false—Iraq may not have a hydrocarbons law, but the central government has been sharing oil revenues equitably and there is no reason at all to imagine that signing the deals would have generated increased violence (and this was certainly not the view of American civilian and military officials on the ground in Iraq at the time). It is certain that killing the deals has delayed the maturation of Iraq’s oil industry without producing the desired hydrocarbons legislation.

Iraq wanted immediate investment. Three senators - Kerry, Schumer and McCaskill - denied American participation. They stopped nothing and accomplished nothing other than empowering China in the global competition for resources and hurting our own American position, again.

It begs the question: Who do you trust, America’s Exxon or China’s CNOOC? We know who they seem to openly hate. Our own.

1. US embassy in Yemen attacked, latest reports indicate 16 killed, no American casualties. Car bomb detonated at gate, followed by minutes of gunfire and second explosion.

2. SecDef Gates is in Afghanistan while JCOS Chairman Mullen arrives in Pakistan. Pakistani army given orders to shoot Americans and US aircraft if another cross-border raid takes place.

3. General Petraeus transfers MNF-I command in Iraq to General Odierno, while Petraeus moves up to CENTCOM to oversee Iraq and Afghanistan/Pakistan theaters.

4. A grenade attack in Mexico has killed seven. Thrown into a Independence Day celebration crowd, suspected as part of the ongoing drug war there.

You might want to pay a bit of special attention to the following from The Associated Press.

Pakistan’s military has ordered its forces to open fire if U.S. troops launch another air or ground raid across the Afghan border, an army spokesman said Tuesday.

The orders, which come in response to a highly unusual Sept. 3 ground attack by U.S. commandos, are certain to heighten tensions between Washington and a key ally against terrorism. Although the ground attack was rare, there have been repeated reports of U.S. drone aircraft striking militant targets, most recently on Sept. 12.

Pakistani officials warn that stepped-up cross-border raids will accomplish little while fueling violent religious extremism in nuclear-armed Pakistan. Some complain that the country is a scapegoat for the failure to stabilize Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s civilian leaders, who have taken a hard line against Islamic militants since forcing Pervez Musharraf to resign as president last month, have insisted that Pakistan must resolve the dispute with Washington through diplomatic channels.

However, army spokesman Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas told The Associated Press that after U.S. helicopters ferried troops into a militant stronghold in the South Waziristan tribal region, the military told field commanders to prevent any similar raids.

“The orders are clear,” Abbas said in an interview. “In case it happens again in this form, that there is a very significant detection, which is very definite, no ambiguity, across the border, on ground or in the air: open fire.”

Pakistan is approaching the clarity some within it desire, such as Nawaz Sharif and Hamid Gul.

We will be either forced to accept it as such or retreat from al-Qaeda.

The choice begins to appear clear, much to Pakistan’s short and long term detriment. The clock ticks…

ADDED NOTE: Rules of Engagement (ROE) agreed to since 2001 have stated that US forces can cross into Pakistan up to 6 miles if they are in “hot pursuit” of retreating Taliban/al-Qaeda attackers. That appears out the window with this order. It should be, or should be treated as such by American forces. If not, then there will most assuredly be an event of ‘confusion’ and a very hot battle with disastrous results.

Open source intelligence (OSINT) is, for lack of a universally-accepted formal definition, information of value that you don’t have to steal with spies or technical means. It can be free or you might have to pay for it but the thrust is that it is not classified or otherwise restricted by a government entity. To an extent we all use OSINT every day for any decision of substance; you identify a question that needs to be answered, you gather information that will help you make an informed decision, you process or analyze that information, and you make a decision based on the outcome of your analytic process. You don’t need a spy or satellite to tell you which car to buy; in many cases a government doesn’t need either of those tools to help it decide whether or not to take some kind of political action against an adversary. A simplistic comparison to be sure, but at the other end of the spectrum consider that all global business runs on OSINT, not secrets.

As a matter of fact, most of the information (later processed into intelligence) national and military decision-makers need to operate can be obtained via open sources (estimates range from 80%-90%), and the value of OSINT has been demonstrated numerous times over the last several years. Acknowledging these facts, this year’s Office of the Director of National Intelligence OSINT Conference focused on the issue of the “decision advantage” OSINT can provide. While it was not an expressed target of the conference, there were numerous discussions about the role social network(ing) and related tech and practices could benefit the IC, something we can do for every -INT but given the related revolution taking place outside of SCIFs worldwide it made the conference a particularly apropos environment.

ThreatsWatch had the pleasure of discussing relevant issues with a number of current and former intelligence practitioners at this year’s Open Source Intelligence Conference: Robert Stede, intelligence community analyst and technologist; Bob Gourley, former Chief Technology Officer at the Defense Intelligence Agency and currently CTO of Crucial Point LLC; Matt Burton, former analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency and currently a consultant to the intelligence community; and Jack Holt, OSD Public Affairs.

TW: The promotion of OSINT as a peer –INT has been going on for some time now, though I don’t think I’m going out on a limb when I say that earlier efforts have fallen short. Do you think what was said at this conference – combined with that you’re seeing in the trenches - backs up the assertion that OSINT is finally coming into its own?

Robert: Is it coming into its own? It is and it isn’t. OSINT’s ubiquity is both a pro and con. It permeates everything in intelligence. If you take away the rules and customs of secrets, all you have left is OSINT, which is knowledge. Some diagram OSINT’s role or place in intelligence as one of many circles in a Venn diagram; I see it as a cornerstone upon which the foundation of all intelligence is built. You can use the finest materials to build your house but if the construction is shoddy it’s all for naught. Today, IC culture and expenditures drive us to buy fancy fixtures and molding, not invest in good architecture up front. The priorities of the Community are also backwards when it comes to sharing and collaboration. The tools and tech we use are serviceable; it’s a rehab of our culture that needs to take place if we’re going to deal with future mysteries and puzzles. We need to divorce ourselves from hierarchy and promote self-forming networks of trusted peers. Fears about reaching out to those who know better than you also has to be curtailed. Rewards for collaboration with peers inside and outside the wire need to be addressed if we ever want to know the truth. I don’t expect this change to happen for a while; we are notoriously slow to understand and respond to emerging threats and concerns for our nation.

Jack: I believe OSINT is coming into its own primarily because the institutions that performed the function previously have been disbanded. USIA was a primary source of intel on cultures, norms, and attitudes in prior years and could give us an idea of who the thought leaders were on certain topics or areas. That information has not been readily available to an expeditionary force. OSINT has given us back that capability.

Matt: I’m not down in the trenches anymore, so I can’t say. In my opinion, it would be best for open source intelligence if the term “OSINT” went away completely. The big reason it isn’t a mainstay is because it’s unclassified, and I think the OSINT label only highlights that when customers come across it. OSINT is not a separate INT. Rather, it comprises all the other INTs we normally use: photos, electronic, people…public satellite imagery is simply unclassified IMINT. Why call it something else that makes it look untrustworthy?

Bob: The nature of the world is changing. More and more is available in open sources. And with our IT systems we can bring the sum total of that to the desktop of our analysts. With social media we can apply more brains to racking and stacking and sorting. So you could argue that OSINT is of growing importance. But what OSINT could have told us that Putin was about to invade Georgia, or that he would mount a sophisticated deception effort to manipulate Western diplomats? Or that he would continue to say he will withdraw but had no intentions of doing so for weeks after the country was crushed? Could you argue that our newfound love affair with OSINT led us to believe we could know Putin’s intent? Did OSINT contribute to yet another failure?

TW: We saw the senior representatives of a number of IC entities get up and talk about their OSINT efforts at a fairly meta-level. Not a day goes by and one of those entities (DHS) gets hammered by Congress for falling down on the job with regards to OSINT. With the benefits so obvious, why do you think it is so hard to turn vision into reality?

Robert: Attitude. The IC’s attitude has not changed. If it’s the first resort, shouldn’t it be funded first?

Jack: I believe part of the problem comes from legacy thinking; the rest is people protecting their rice bowls.

Matt: I’m not familiar with the report, but it’s probably a combination of things: execs being unwilling to be the first to take the leap, preferring that one of their peers do it first; middle managers who clog the flow of new ideas between desk workers and executives; and desk workers being stuck in their ways, unwilling and unable to learn a new business practice on their own.

TW: We heard a lot about “cognitive diversity” and the value that it can bring to analytic problems. Since OSINT is more or less tailor made for such an approach, how come there has not been a more significant outreach to SMEs outside the IC? We’ve done it in the past with classified works.

Robert: There’s a fear of showing “our hand.” We hear this stupid notion of the “Washington Post Test: If it can be ran in the Washington Post, it’s bad.” I think we need to be working with whomever, wherever them may be. And it was Dan Butler who said we need a little more humility to accomplish this. With a little more humility we can put our questions to a trusted network of groups, individuals, or machines. I would also argue that we could leverage our own citizens by just placing our puzzle pieces out there. We would be taking a large risk, but would feel that the return would be just as big. We have to face the reality that we cannot do this work alone and we have to grow into it.

Jack: Outreach to other SMEs will come more easily as we work through re-framing the environment to bring better understanding of the global information environment to the legacy thinkers. Example is how we’ve made a totem pole of “strategic communication” with no real understanding of what it is. SC is a process of identifying the strategically important publics for mission success and then finding a way to tell them what we’re doing. That has a big IC component, an operational component, and a public affairs component. And, for example, if public affairs doesn’t avail itself of the intel then the command is speaking without intelligence. We’ve seen and heard enough of that.

Matt: Haven’t thought about this. A few possibilities: maybe it’s a lot easier to get outsiders to help us when we have classified info to show them. Or maybe, because those outsiders already work with this OSINT day in and day out, there’s no need to ask them for their input; it’s already out there. Global Futures is the only such outreach effort I know of. Any others?

TW: Play king for a day; how would you re-align the current OSINT budget for your agency (or the community); what would you do with a 10% increase in funding?

Robert: More people with the right mindset; people for whom sharing is the default setting. If we all don’t share or realize that we can’t do it all, it’s going to hurt our team. There are hundreds of people who wanted to be here in Analyst X’s chair; if Analyst X is being introverted and unwilling to share what they know, that person is hurting far more than helping.

If I couldn’t break the manpower ceiling I’d move to enable all of our data to be interoperable. There are two things that run concurrent through any information: space and time. Linking information by place would get us off and running in the right direction to integrate a multi-discipline community for multi-disciplinary problems.

Jack: More investment should be made in people. Collection and analysis is primary with training in the available products, processes, and the technologies available. Then investment in making the technologies shareable across the community.

Matt: Systems and training. Give the systems guys some of that budget and ask them to built a JWICS-to-Web port. We have to get the Web at the desk of every single analyst, and do it in a way that keeps them from having to switch machines. As long as the two networks are segregated, there will be a psychological barrier between “JWICS, where I do my work,” and “The computer where I check my Gmail.”

TW: If you had to draw a line in the National Intelligence Priorities Framework - stuff that would exclusively be handed over to OSINT practitioners outside the IC – where would it be drawn? If you could focus more OSINT on a given mission(s) which one(s) would they be?

Robert: I couldn’t really say. You could throw them all over the fence if you wanted. They’re just questions.

Jack: I see this as a complete package where someone gathers, another analyzes, another speaks, and the communication is whole. IC monitors and analyzes while PA discusses and puts back and every interaction changes the environment. To build to more understanding.

Matt: My first-hand experience in the various intelligence domains is limited. Bottom line though is that I’m sure they could all probably do with a healthy injection of more unclassified information.

TW: Best thing you heard an IC senior say? Worst/most disturbing/annoying?

Bob: Without a doubt, the best thing I heard any IC senior say was Glenn Gaffney stated he believes it to be our responsibility to field an infrastructure with the ability to enable IC users to mashup data. We owe this to today’s analysts and tomorrow’s; and we must build an infrastructure that will let tomorrow’s users do things like mash up data in ways we might not even imagine. Seeing a senior IC leader articulate a vision on mashups really left me feeling like the community is in great hands.

As a runner up, I have to say it was Director Hayden’s quoting of the great master of operational Intelligence Vince Fragromene. Vince was quoted as having taught Director Hayden that “if you live by SIGINT you die by SIGINT”, meaning that you cannot simply trust any single source for an assessment. Vince and others drummed that lesson into my head as well, and I saw time and time again how important it is to seek every possible source that has information or context on a particular situation. It is also critically important to know the strengths and weaknesses of every source. For example, HUMINT might reveal intentions, but if a Human said it then it could also be a lie. ELINT might reveal a precise location but if a parameter is captured wrong it may totally mis-identify the radar that is there. SOSUS might actually be a bottom bounce hit and the Sub may actually be way far away vice close. Imagery might have been taken at the time the activity was over or may be taking pictures of fake targets. The lesson is, you must use every possible source and you must know its weakness. And the reason Director Hayden was telling us about Vince’s lesson was it is even more important to OSINT. Just because it is said does not mean it is true.

Robert: “Here’s some money. Go do this.” Actually, I like Secretary Gates’ speech last year discussing the need to have individuals like John Boyd. Boyd’s mantra about choosing what to be is great. Either you go off to “be someone” or you “do something.” We need more “do,” because right now, we have a large “say-do” gap.

Jack: Everything Glenn Gaffney said was the best thing along with Gen. Hayden. I don’t recall anything disturbing but that is probably because if disturbing statements are made then impact is being had.

Matt: The best thing was an astonishing policy opinion stated in private by a very senior person in the community; I’d rather not run the risk of upsetting him, but needless to say it was very positive. The worst thing was also said during a private conversation with another senior: In the context of FISA, wiretapping, telco immunity, etc: “These people share their lives online, then complain about invasion of privacy.” This is disturbing in the context of the conference because it demonstrates a lack of awareness of how online communities work.

As one speaker at the conference noted, a lot of long-time intelligence practitioners doubt the value of OSINT and they chaff at the thought that freely available information is more valuable than secrets. More to the point, they consider any efforts to more effectively integrate freely available information into the intelligence business to be anathema and entertaining such change is a threat to national security. The threat however, is in not pursuing such a course of action, because it is abundantly clear that our adversaries - particularly non-state adversaries - are doing it and in many cases eating our lunch in the process. It was easy to dismiss al-Qaeda on 9/10/01; not so much the day after, and they managed their far-flug and clandestine operation without the trappings and “benefits” of our intelligence community. Making full use of OSINT is not simply a trendy thing to do, but a vital aspect of any effort designed to reboot the intelligence community. We appreciate your time and thank you for participating in this discussion.

Pakistan’s high commissioner to Britain has warned the UK that the US attacks on the Taliban and al-Qaeda inside Pakistan are making Britain vulnerable to attack. From The Age:

Wajid Shamsul Hasan said the attacks on Taliban and al-Qaeda suspects were making the streets of Britain less safe and that resentment was mounting among Pakistanis in the country, with community leaders calling for that anger to be “organised”.

His remarks followed outrage in Pakistan over five attacks in the past 10 days, including a ground assault in the town of Angoor Adda in which 20 people were killed. US officials said all were supporters of terrorism but Pakistan insists they were civilians, including women and children.

Mr Hasan said: “This will infuriate Muslims in this country and make the streets of London less safe. There are one million Pakistanis in the diaspora here and resentment is mounting.

“I’m being flooded by text messages from community leaders saying we must organise our anger. The Americans’ trigger-happy actions will radicalise young Muslims. They’re playing into the hands of the very militants we’re supposed to be fighting.”

Don’t ever fall for thinking that the radicalization of Pakistanis or any other group is the fault of the United States and its war against terrorists in the region. Likewise, don’t fall for thinking that all Pakistanis are prey to radicalization. There is a difference between anger and radicalization.

Bottom line: If we feel compelled to go after Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorists inside Pakistan - the same terrorists who also target Pakistanis - and this angers some, even many, this is a consequence we will have to accept.

For the consequences of doing nothing - or relying upon Pakistani forces to continue ineffective actions that amount to nearly nothing - are far worse than the alternative.

UPDATE: In reading the Daily Times of Pakistan, there seems to be mixed messages being sent from Britain. Jack Straw says the UK does not support US atacks in Britain, while Prime Minister Brown has voiced his support.

The United Kingdom does not support [foreign] strikes in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Dawn News quoted UK Secretary for Justice Jack Straw on Monday.

In a meeting with Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif in Lahore, Straw reiterated the UK’s commitment to stop cross-border movement of terrorists and attacks by US led forces in Pakistan, the channel said. It said Straw’s statement was in contrast with an earlier statement by UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown backing US incursions into Pakistan.

One way or the other, a bit of clarity here, Britain?

1. Tension between US and Pakistan government continues to be ratcheted by Nawaz Sharif and PML-N representatives. Meanwhile, the Taliban attacked, seized, and then withdrew from a government building in Peshawar, the NWFP capitol, in a show of capabilities.

2. The Obama campaign is coming under fire for potential violations of the Logan Act as Iraq’s foreign minister is quoted as saying the candidate queried Iraqi officials about delaying withdrawal agreements until after a new US administration was in place.

3. Stating what observers have said for over four years, a new IAEA report says that Iran is stonewalling its nuclear weapons probe.

4. An Islamist 9/11 conference - “The September Attacks: Have You Learned the Lesson?” - was held in Britain as reports surface that the UK government has now given official legal authority to sharia courts.

5. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) kills one-third of a 35+ man Mauritanian military patrol in the desert African country.